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Protectable “Art”:
Urinals, Bananas, and Shredders
Richard Chused*
Creative souls have long played with our imaginations, as well
as our tastes, about what art may be. The resulting absurdist, dada,
and everyday object art forces us to step back and ask a few intellectual property questions about what this art has done, undone,
or reconstructed in the copyright world. The Copyright Act grants
protection to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” This Article
explores how pranksterism, eccentricity, repackaging of ordinary
objects, and decay can be subsumed within legal categories of
copyright law like originality, fixation, protectable two- or threedimensional art, and moral rights.
Taking concepts from the history of art, from modern notions
of visual perception, and from recent developments in the understanding of random motion, this Article unravels copyright conundrums involving artistic use of everyday objects. Three artists are
highlighted: Marcel Duchamp, who created art by placing a
urinal on a pedestal; Maurizio Cattelan, who recently hung slowly
decaying bananas at an exhibition; and Banksy, who inserted a
shredder in a composition’s frame and activated it at an auction.

* Professor of Law, New York Law School. I’d like to thank New York Law School for its
continuous support of my writing endeavors. Thanks also to Jacob Sherkow, my one-time
colleague now on the faculty at the University of Illinois, who read an earlier draft and
passed along some fascinating comments. The same kudos go to my present colleague
Richard Sherwin, a scholar always brimming with provocative and interesting questions.
And of course, my artist wife Elizabeth Langer, who continually presents and provokes
fascinating questions about the content and nature of aesthetic experience.
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Comparing the work of these three provocative artists with a
variety of other well-known creative souls leads to the conclusion
that Duchamp’s urinal, Cattelan’s creation of instructions for
taping a banana to a wall, and Banksy’s integration of a shredder
into the frame of a two-dimensional work are fully protected as
copyrightable works.
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INTRODUCTION

During the last century and the early decades of our present era,
the art world exploded in fanciful and wonderful ways. Three
memorable examples make this point: Marcel Duchamp’s The
Fountain—a urinal set atop a pedestal;1 Maurizio Cattelan’s banana
caper The Comedian—a banana attached to a gallery wall with duct
tape (that later was removed and eaten by the mischievous David
Datuna);2 and Banksy’s shredding prank at a Sotheby’s auction in

1

The famous Fountain is typically attributed to Marcel Duchamp. However, the idea
may have belonged to a woman named Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven. See Siri
Hustvedt, A Woman in the Men’s Room: When Will the Art World Recognise the Real Artist
Behind Duchamp’s Fountain?, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.theguardian.
com/books/2019/mar/29/marcel-duchamp-fountain-women-art-history [https://perma.cc/
XG43-UXG9]. There certainly is contrary, or at least doubtful, commentary on the matter
as well. See The Fascinating Tale of Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain, PHAIDON (May 26,
2016), https://www.phaidon.com/agenda/art/articles/2016/may/26/the-fascinating-tale-ofmarcel-duchamps-fountain/ [https://perma.cc/DQ8D-433D].
2
Robin Pogrebin, Banana Splits: Spoiled by Its Own Success, the $120,000 Fruit Is
Gone, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/08/arts/design/
banana-removed-art-basel.html [https://perma.cc/79XZ-KCE9]; Jason Farago, A
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2018—a shredder installed in the frame of a two-dimensional work
and surreptitiously activated at an auction of the work. 3
Creative souls have long played with our imaginations, if not our
tastes, about what art may be. The resulting absurdist, dada, and
everyday object art forces us to step back and ask a few intellectual
property questions about what this art has done, undone, or
reconstructed in the copyright world. The Copyright Act grants
protection to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 4 This Article
explores how pranksterism,5 eccentricity, repackaging of ordinary
objects, and decay can be subsumed within legal categories—such
as originality, fixation, protectable two- or three-dimensional art,
and moral rights—of the Copyright Act.6
By way of introduction, consider an event much less widely
heralded as art than the works of Duchamp, Cattelan, and Banksy.
In 2016, two visiting teenagers found the art on display at the San
(Grudging) Defense of the $120,000 Banana, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/08/arts/design/a-critics-defense-of-cattelan-banana.html [https://perma.cc/CN32-AZGZ]. Cattelan also hit the front pages after installing a
solid gold, functioning toilet in one of the restrooms at the Solomon R. Guggenheim
Museum in New York City. America by Maurizio Cattelan, available at GUGGENHEIM
MUSEUM, https://www.guggenheim.org/exhibition/maurizio-cattelan-america [https://
perma.cc/9QQ3-MQBQ]. The toilet was later moved to the Blenheim Palace, the birthplace
of Winston Churchill, in Woodstock, Oxfordshire, England, and was apparently stolen on
September 14, 2019. Alex Marshall, What Happened to the Stolen Gold Toilet?, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/20/arts/design/gold-toiletamerica.html [https://perma.cc/G3EN-CUBE].
3
Scott Reyburn, Banksy Painting Self-Destructs After Fetching $1.4 Million at
Sotheby’s, N.Y. T IMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018//06/arts/design/
uk-banksy-painting-sothebys.html [https://perma.cc/3CGB-385C]; Scott Reyburn, How
Banksy’s Prank Might Boost His Prices: ‘It’s a Part of Art History,’ N.Y. T IMES (Oct. 7,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018//07/arts/design/banksy-artwork-painting.html
[https://perma.cc/K9PL-ZWDF].
4
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102.
5
For an interesting commentary on Banksy, art, and pranksterism, see Anna Tichy,
Banksy: Artist, Prankster, or Both?, 64 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
6
Copyright protection exists in original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium
of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102. Authors gain protection against infringers for two- and
three-dimensional works of art, and many of them also obtain moral rights to prevent the
mutilation or destruction of their works. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A.
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Francisco Museum of Modern Art 7 to be simple minded. They
decided to emulate that simplicity by placing a pair of eyeglasses on
the floor directly beneath other artwork hanging on the wall.8 The
move generated a surprising variety of responses from visitors—as
shown in a few of the photos displayed by the teenagers, Kevin
Nguyen and TJ Khayatan—and on Twitter. 9 A number of the social
network’s users found this episode more amusing than creative after
the pictures circulated on the Internet. 10 Two of the images are
shown below.

Although this event certainly had a humorous side, it raised
important legal questions. What, for example, is the legal status of
the spectacles on the floor? Placing the eyeglasses on the floor
7

Christopher Mele, Is It Art? Eyeglasses on Museum Floor Began as Teenagers’
Prank, N.Y. T IMES (May 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/arts/sfmomaglasses-prank.html [https://perma.cc/9SHR-MNSS].
8
Id.
9
Id. Others not shown here also are available online.
10
Id.
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certainly was an original gesture. But many may not consider this
original for copyright purposes because the teenagers did not add
anything new to or alter the spectacles themselves.
While I find the gesture delightfully original, it takes a bit of
work to reach that conclusion under the copyright statute. The
spectacles were fixed in a tangible medium of expression, but the
artists had little if anything to do with creating or fixing the object
of attention—the eyeglasses. Perhaps, therefore, they did not
express anything. Ultimately, I conclude that the spectacles were
both fixed and expressive, though as with originality, reaching that
conclusion is not straightforward. There are complex questions
about whether the placement of the eyeglasses was a work of twoor three-dimensional artistic expression within the meaning of the
Copyright Act. Furthermore, what would have happened if someone
had stomped on the glasses and smashed them to smithereens? The
teenager whose spectacles were ruined certainly would have had a
viable tort claim for damage to his property. But would they be able
to bring intellectual property claims as well for mutilation or
destruction of a work of visual art? 11 This Article explores
eyeglasses and other memorable artistic moments using several
prominent and some lesser known examples. 12

11

See 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
The analysis proceeds entirely under the Copyright Act of 1976, even though a
number of the artworks discussed here appeared before that act went into effect on January
1, 1978. The new act completely reconstructed critical components of copyright law. For
example, a work is now considered “created” at the moment of fixation rather than at the
moment of publication with notice, and the requirements for a copyright to exist have
generally been altered. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101. These changes mean that it makes
little sense to reconsider the artworks in this article under statutory terms that largely went
into the dustbin of history about half a century ago. That approach obviously fudges the
analysis, but the goal of this Note is to think about the flexibility and malleability of the
extant code, and to wonder about where the present rules may allow us to venture.
12
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ORIGINALITY: URINALS

Louise Nevelson, Big Black (1963)

Let’s begin with the sculptural work of Louise Nevelson, known
for arranging standard and decorative wood pieces into truly original
works.13 Many of the objects she placed in her works were useful
during their initial manufacture or incorporation into building
construction projects. Nevelson found or acquired them, cut some
of them into pieces, and converted them into parts of unusual
sculptural works.14 Despite the nondescript, useful nature of many
of the pieces when they were at lumber yards, ornament stores,
construction sites, or salvage lots, Nevelson’s artistic vision allowed
them to be assembled in a wholly new, creative, and original way. 15
13

See Louis Nevelson, Big Black, available at MUSEUM OF MOD. ART.,
https://www.moma.org/collection/works/81177 [https://perma.cc/9FLZ-FPQ7]; see also
Louis Nevelson, ART STORY, https://www.theartstory.org/artist/nevelson-louise/
[https://perma.cc/M7SV-RKSG].
14
See Louis Nevelson, supra note 1313.
15
Id.
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While she worked within the twentieth century movement—made
famous by Duchamp’s use of ordinary, everyday objects for artistic
purposes—her intention from the outset was to strip the pieces of
any useful pretense and reconfigure them into a form recognized as
artistic by many, if not all, viewers. 16 Nevelson turned discernably
ordinary items used daily by carpenters and furniture makers into
aesthetic constructs, rather than setting them up as standalone
objects for placement in galleries or museums. 17 By altering and
assembling them into compositions lacking any pretense of utility,
she simply used everyday objects as compositional elements. 18
The assemblage qualities of Nevelson’s works point to the nub
of the copyright problems surrounding Duchamp’s use of a
standalone urinal as an artistic subject. Ordinary objects, like those
used by Nevelson, are clearly part of a newly composed original
work. But everyday articles totally visible in their ordinary, standard
configurations may not be original copyrightable works if they do
not qualify on their own as a sculpture.19 These articles seem to be
simply discernible and practically available for use in everyday life.

16

See id.
Id.
18
Id.
19
If useful items have aspects that may be separated from their utility, then the
pieces may quality as sculpture. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. The statute defines a sculptural works
as follows:
“[T]hree-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art…art
reproductions…globes… [and] models…Such works shall include
works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful
article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a…sculptural
work only if, and only to the extent that, such design
incorporates…sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian
aspects of the article.” Id.
17
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Marcel Duchamp, Fountain (1917)20

Does this same conclusion govern the state of intellectual
property rights in Duchamp’s Fountain? Did anything change
dramatically when the urinal was placed on a stand and put in a
photograph studio for others to “admire” as an object of art in its
own right? In contrast to Nevelson, Duchamp changed the object in
apparently minor and perhaps mundane ways. 21 The only easily
discernible and major change was the urinal’s location.
20

This image is the now famous photograph of the original version of The Fountain,
taken by Alfred Stieglitz in 1917. Marcel Duchamp Fountain by Alfred Stiegliz, available
at WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fountain_(Duchamp)#/media/File:Marcel_
Duchamp,_1917,_Fountain,_photograph_by_Alfred_Stieglitz.jpg
[https://perma.cc/JEW3-AP2R]. This version of the piece dropped out of sight shortly after
this picture was taken and has not been seen since. See Fountain by Marcel Duchamp,
available at TATE MUSEUM, https://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/duchamp-fountaint07573 [perma.cc/28EE-QKRP]. A number of replicas have been made and are now housed
at major museums. Id.
21
However, as will be seen shortly, those apparently minor alterations of the urinal may
be quite meaningful and significant. See infra p. 182.
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Are there any important intellectual property differences
between a urinal on a warehouse storage shelf waiting for a buyer,
one that is installed and in use in a standard bathroom location,
or one on an art gallery pedestal?22 If the intention of the person
making such a move to a gallery was to morph the object into a
“design” or a “sculpture” for viewing and contemplation rather
than mere presentation of an object of complete utility, were there
legal consequences?
Compare the urinal to the eyeglasses on the floor of the San
Francisco Museum of Art. The same questions may be posed there.
At times, spectacles speak with a utilitarian voice—as when placed
on the head of a person needing eye corrections or in a display
case at an optometrist’s emporium. But the voice surely changes
when they are placed in a solitary fashion on a museum floor underneath a painting or other artwork. Given the intentions of the young
men who deployed the spectacles, the glasses then became an
aesthetic project.
But now, you say, how can kids messing around in a museum be
artistic? Think twice. We all know of “one-hit-wonders” in the pop

22

One could ask identical questions about other works of Duchamp or other artists using
everyday objects. Two years before The Fountain was created in 1915, Duchamp also
“made” In Advance of the Broken Arm—simply a snow shovel he hung in his studio. See
In Advance of the Broken Arm, in MUSEUM OF MOD. ART, https://www.moma.org/
collection/works/105050 [https://perma.cc/ST2R-NJR5] [Hereinafter Broken Arm]. The
original, like the first urinal, is lost, but it has been replicated. Id. One copy is at the
Museum of Modern Art. Id. This is the museum’s description of the piece:
Beginning in 1913 Duchamp challenged accepted artistic standards by
selecting mass-produced, functional objects from everyday life and
designating them as works of art. These sculptures, which he called
“readymades” were aimed at subverting traditional notions of skill,
uniqueness, and beauty, boldly declaring that an artist could create
simply by making choices. Duchamp purchased the first version of this
work in a hardware store in 1915, signed and dated the shovel, and
hung it on display from his studio ceiling. Its title, In Advance of the
Broken Arm, playfully alludes to the objects intended purpose.
Id.; see also Marcel Duchamp, In Advance of the Broken Arm or Shovel, in TOUS-FAIT,
https://www.toutfait.com/unmaking_the_museum/Shovel.html [https://perma.cc/G243EGB8].
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music world.23 Surely that can happen in the art world as well—even
when just spectacles are involved. It’s called inspiration. We can’t
explain it, but we know it’s real. One of the most famous works in
the world of American art is Grant Wood’s American Gothic. He
created other paintings, but this is by far the most memorable. 24 Or
perhaps Maya Lin’s Vietnam Memorial better fits the bill.25 Lin
never completed any noteworthy works before winning the
commission.26 It was pure inspiration arising from a student project
on funereal architecture that led to her opportunity.27 It shocked the
architecture world when it was announced that a student crafted the
winning design, as hundreds of other architects, including many
very well-known practitioners, were bested.28

23

There are many online lists of the best hit songs by a singer or group that never made
another popular tune. See, e.g., Gabbi Shaw, The 57 Best One-Hit Wonders of All Time,
INSIDER (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.insider.com/best-one-hit-wonders-2018-5
[https://perma.cc/UTQ8-QWXF].
24
American Gothic is in the collection of the Art Institute of Chicago. See Grant Wood,
American Gothic, at ART INST. CHI., https://www.artic.edu/artworks/6565/american-gothic
[https://perma.cc/TKP4-C5WZ].
25
Christopher Klein, The Remarkable Story of Maya Lin’s Vietnam Veterans Memorial,
BIOGRAPHY (May 14, 2020), https://www.biography.com/news/maya-lin-vietnam-veteransmemorial [https://perma.cc/HD6F-KU72].
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
See Student Wins War Memorial Contest, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 1981),
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/07/us/student-wins-war-memorial-contest.html
[https://perma.cc/7SYR-563V].
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Claes Oldenberg, Typewriter Eraser (1976)

In each of the three urinal settings—warehouse, restroom, and
gallery pedestal—the object itself was the same. In that regard, it is
quite different from Claes Oldenburg’s standalone emulations of
everyday objects, such as the eraser pictured above. 29 Oldenburg did
not cut objects like Nevelson or move commercially purchased
objects to a potentially significant place. Instead he made large,
oversized mockups of manufactured items and often placed them in
visible locations for public viewing.30 They became humorous and
outrageous. These creations represented a substantial change in
appearance and scale. By fashioning the eraser, 31 Oldenburg created
29

See Oldenburg’s ‘Typewriter Eraser’ Sculpture on Display, LIVEAUCTIONEERS (Mar.
27, 2013), https://www.liveauctioneers.com/news/top-news/art-design/oldenburgs-type
writer-eraser-sculpture-on-display-in-ny/ [https://perma.cc/T8G6-6ECS]. This picture was
taken in 2013 when the piece was available for private purchase from Christie’s auction
house in New York. Id.
30
See Claes Oldenburg, THE ART STORY, https://www.theartstory.org/artist/oldenburgclaes/ [https://perma.cc/9HAA-8JQM]
31
Id.
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a dramatic reconfiguration of an item that, in its small utilitarian
state, was once an office staple. Unlike the urinal, Oldenburg’s art
objects were obviously not utilitarian.
Although some copyright limitations make it difficult to claim
protection in works like Fountain, there are also oft cited cases that
might lead to the opposite conclusion.32 The Copyright Act states
clearly that concepts, ideas, and facts are not protected. 33 They are
the structural building blocks for civil discourse and therefore
ineligible for copyright protection.34 Similarly, items such as blank
canvases hung on a museum wall or painted in one single color may
be such basic parts of artistic building blocks, that no property rights
should inhere in them. How can any artist declare a blank canvas to
be art and still meet the traditional originality standard requiring
imposition of some creativity on an object obtain protection? The
requisite level of creativity may be minimal in degree, but there must
still be some creativity present; as Justice O’Connor noted in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.:
Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only
that the work was independently created by the
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and
that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity. . . . To be sure, the requisite level of
creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will
suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade
quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, “no
matter how crude, humble or obvious” it might be. 35
This notion is echoed in another renowned case—Alfred Bell v.
Catalda Fine Arts—involving the copyrightability of mezzotints
intended to reproduce famous works as closely as possible, where
the Second Circuit noted:
Accordingly, we were not ignoring the Constitution
when we stated that a ‘copy of something in the
32

See Glenn Cheng, The Aesthetics of Copyright Adjudication, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV.
113, 127–30 (2012) (discussing arguments for both sides).
33
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
34
See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347–58 (1991).
35
Id. (citations omitted).
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public domain’ will support a copyright if it is a
‘distinguishable variation’; or when we rejected the
contention that ‘like a patent, a copyrighted work
must be not only original, but new’, adding, ‘That is
not . . . the law as is obvious in the case of maps or
compendia, where later works will necessarily be
anticipated.’ All that is needed to satisfy both the
Constitution and the statute is that the ‘author’
contributed something more than a ‘merely trivial’
variation, something recognizably ‘his own.’
Originality in this context ‘means little more than a
prohibition of actual copying.’ No matter how poor
artistically the ‘author’s’ addition, it is enough if it
be his own.36
These well-known and oft quoted passages require some
minimum intervention by an artist upon an object to qualify as an
original, and therefore copyrightable, work. Placement in a location,
upon a display stand, or on the wall of a museum does nothing
notable to the object itself. Presumably, Justice O’Connor would
have trouble protecting Duchamp’s work. The only possible
intimation of originality was the artist’s endeavor—intent if you
will—to change perceptions about the everyday nature of the object
in the minds of those who view it by placing it in a location that it
never or rarely occupied before. Suggesting that any object—even a
urinal—may take on aesthetic pretensions undermines prior
understandings about what constitutes art, challenges artists to think
in wholly different ways about the nature of their enterprise, and
forces viewers to think more broadly about art’s outer limits. 37
Those notions form the basis for a claim of originality in works
such as The Fountain. Given the importance of that work’s public

36

Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102–03 (2d Cir. 1951)
(citations omitted).
37
This sort of claim has, of course, been subject to humorous gibes. See, e.g., Ardell
Padenom, Art is Anything You Can Get Away With, PADENOM (May 14, 2011),
http://ardellpadenom.blogspot.com/2011/05/art-is-anything-you-can-get-away-with.html
[https://perma.cc/Q3MR-B4F5]. Andy Warhol has often been quoted as saying “Art is
anything you can get away with,” but the crack actually originated with Marshall McLuhan.
Id.
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display in the history of art, it would be surprising, to say the least,
if copyright law did not protect it. And why should physically
altering an object itself be the sine qua non of originality? Finding
original, and in most of these cases totally new ways, to conjure up
aesthetic judgments in the minds of viewers is just as imaginative—
maybe more so—as physically modifying a preexisting object,
using an artistic substance to make a new work, or mimicking a preexisting classic. For artists, placement of works in particular
locations or adjacent to other objects is often a key element of
“making” or “completing” the works themselves. 38 Observers in a
modern art museum, like the spectacle pranksters at the San
Francisco Museum of Modern Art, 39 might find the art silly or
deserving of mockery. They might say, “Gee, I can do that.” But
those museum visitors were not the first people to create this art!
It took creative souls like Duchamp, Cattelan, or Banksy to challenge preexisting aesthetic norms. These innovators were creative
and skeptics should give credit where it is due.
Granting Fountain protection may seem unusual but doing so
actually falls within the copyright mainstream. The best examples
of this may be books treated as factual works after their authors
present claimed they were true historical accounts, even though
virtually all reputable historians found them to be fictional.
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc. highlights this phenomenon.40 In 1962, A. A. Hoehling wrote Who Destroyed the
Hindenburg?, claiming the final segments of the volume were a
factual account of the sabotage that downed the large German
dirigible.41 When others later used Hoehling’s account in books and
movies, he sued for copyright infringement and lost.42 The court
concluded that if an author presents an historical interpretation of a

38

See Richard Chused, Moral Rights: The Anti-Rebellion Graffiti Heritage of 5Pointz,
41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 583, 599 (2018) (making a similar argument about large
assemblages of street artworks at major street sites).
39
See Mele, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.Error! Bookmark not defined.
(identifying the action of teenagers Kevin Nguyen and T.J. Khayatan placing eyeglasses
on the floor of the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art).
40
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1980).
41
See id at 975.
42
See id at 977.
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story as factual, it will be treated that way in a copyright dispute.43
Because facts, like ideas, are not copyrightable, 44 and his claim
involved copying of his story-line but not the way it was expressed,
Hoehling’s infringement allegation could only fail. It may have
taken a bit of chutzpah for Hoehling to make an untrue. In that vein,
Hoehling certainly was no different from Duchamp, Banksy, or
Cattelan. His claim of creative license, however, caused him to lose
his case. In many settings, creativity is seen as out-rageous, silly, or
boldly beyond the capacity of society to accept. This often is just the
sort of thing that the law of creativity ought to protect! Creativity is
what provokes reactions in the minds of viewers and readers—
exactly what one would expect good visionary work to elicit.
There are many prominent examples of the impact an author’s
frame of mind has on the scope of copyright protection. Consider
Mark Rothko’s acclaimed Chapel at the Menil Collection in
Houston,45 or the display of Monet’s Water Lilies paintings at the
Musée de l’Orangerie in Paris.46 In each case, artists collaborated
with architects to place a well-conceived array of related works in
spaces that fulfilled the painters’ preferences about how best to
present their work to the public. Moving one of Rothko’s paintings
out of The Chapel or one of Monet’s pieces out of l’Orangerie would
crush their artistic goals. To reject protection of works like The
Fountain is to cast off twentieth, and now twenty-first century,
artistic trends incorporating artistic placement and juxtapositions of
works as crucial features of the works themselves. After all, composition is an essential element in painting. Surely, similar considerations should be taken into account when placing a painting amid
other related works. Using the creator’s intent as an influential factor
in settings similar to Duchamp’s novel displays of readymade objects makes a great deal of sense.
But relying on intent also creates innumerable challenges. Was
the placement of the eyeglasses on the floor of the San Francisco
43

See id at 978–79.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
45
See ROTHKO CHAPEL, http://www.rothkochapel.org/learn/about/ [https://perma.cc/
J9MU-YDF4].
46
Claude Monet’s Water Lillies, MUSÉE DE L’ORANGERIE, https://www.museeorangerie.fr/en/article/claude-monets-water-lilies [https://perma.cc/9HX6-9QHT].
44
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Museum of Art intended as art, a prank, or both? Is answering that
question even important? Can humor and irony be embedded in
artistic works? How can intention, meaningful to copyright law, be
distinguished from a frame of mind with no particular significance?
How important are the reactions of viewers to the notion of what art
may be?
Similarly, was Banksy’s insertion and use of a shredder
embedded in the frame of a work sold at auction a statement of
artistic intent or a remarkable prank?47 Or what of Cattelan’s banana
taped to a gallery wall?48 Does Justice O’Connor’s objective desire
to discern physical differences imposed by an artist upon an object
or a work need changing to take subjective goals into account? 49 In
short, discerning intent is a slippery task at best. Indeed, rather than
describing Duchamp’s intention as an inspiring tale about
undermining traditional aesthetics by treating everyday objects as
artistic, philosopher Steven Hicks 50 describes Duchamp in a cynical,
if not perverse way:
The artist is not a great creator—Duchamp went
shopping at a plumbing store. The artwork is not a
special object - it was mass-produced in a factory.
The experience of art is not exciting and ennobling at best it is puzzling and mostly leaves one with a
sense of distaste. But over and above that, Duchamp
did not select just any ready-made object to display.
In selecting the urinal, his message was clear: Art is
something you piss on.51

47

See Reyburn, supra note 3.
See Pogrebin, supra note 2.
49
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991).
50
Hicks is in the Philosophy Department of Rockford University in Rockford, Illinois,
and is the university’s Executive Director of the Center for Ethics and Entrepreneurship.
See Campus Directory, ROCKFORD UNIV., https://www.rockford.edu/campusdirectory/hicks-stephen/[https://perma.cc/63T5-FP6B].
51
See The Fascinating Tale of Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain, supra note 1. According
to this essay, the work was actually “pissed” on. Id.
48
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Claims have been made that The Fountain was indeed urinated

on.

52

Hicks forces us to ask whether intent fulfilling the originality
requirement may be tongue in cheek, harshly dismissive of traditional artistic understandings, or both? Or must intent present some
aesthetic judgment? Will placing spectacles on the floor of a
museum or taping a rotting object on a museum wall, like the banana
in Cattelan’s The Comedian, come with the requisite frame of mind?
Much celebrated art reached this lofty state by breaking new
ground—using a different technique, a new sense of perspective, an
abstract form presented in a new way, or a portrayal of figures or the
human condition in a new way. Legal norms should encourage the
art world to recognize new aesthetic theories that provide important
commentary on human experience. Intent need not be directly
related to a particular art object but simply to technique, culture, or
expectations about the behavior of art viewers. Most such shifts
have easily fallen into the copyright basket. If this is what intent
requires, then Duchamp’s work more than qualifies.
All these questions about intent require one more look at The
Fountain. There actually was one, perhaps obvious, alteration to the
urinal—the addition of the cryptic “R Mutt 1917” drawn scrawled
on its lip.53 That and other aspects of The Fountain may make the
originality issue much easier to resolve. First, the whole episode
might simply be a spoof or a parody of then extant artistic practices.
In that sense, it was like Cattelan’s The Comedian except that
Duchamp’s humor was more subtle. Humor is well protected as original for copyright purposes.54 If humor or irony was part of
Duchamp’s motivation or part of the spectacle event in San
Francisco, then it has long been honored with protectable status.
A funny new joke certainly meets the originality standard. Humor
even enjoys a privileged status in fair use law—parody, for example,
typically takes some material from the preexisting work it mocks,
52

See When Brian Eno & Other Artists Peed in Marcel Duchamp’s Famous Urinal,
OPEN
CULTURE
(Sept.
24,
2015),
http://www.openculture.com/2015/09/
when-brian-eno-other-artists-peed-in-marcel-duchamps-famous-urinal.html
[https://perma.cc/Q5743LHE]; The Fountain, supra note 1.
53
See Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain, supra note 1.
54
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 597 (1994).
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but courts consistently recognize its transformative nature in
analyzing fair use.55 Additionally, the Supreme Court recognized
parody as a special and widely accepted form of originality.56 It is
important to note that Duchamp was associated with a group of
provocative artists, including Francis Picabia, intent on satirizing
and undermining traditional artistic norms.57
Other theories about Duchamp’s artistic goals for The Fountain
have been suggested. There are, for example, claims that “R. Mutt”
was a pseudonym adopted by Baroness Elsa von FreytagLoringhoven.58 There are some who think the Baroness was behind
the use of a urinal by Duchamp. 59 Additionally, there are important
scholarly art history essays arguing that the piece was deeply sensual
or closely related to early twentieth century homoerotic debates. For
example, William Camfield, in a thorough essay on The Fountain,
provided both another explanation for the cryptic “R Mutt 1917”
inscription and argued persuasively that the piece carried erotic
overtones.60 When the urinal was submitted to the American Society
of Independent Artists for inclusion in its first show in 1917, it was
turned in under the name of Richard Mutt.61 Camfield also noted the
sensual curves of the item when it was removed from practical use
and placed in a “prone” position;62 he contended that Duchamp
actually viewed it as erotic.63

55

Id.
Id.
57
See, e.g., Mathilde, Duchamp, Picabia, New York Dada and the Machine, WORLD OF
ART (May 7, 2015), https://worldartworld.wordpress.com/2015/05/07/marcel-duchampsready-mades/ [https://perma.cc/4K92-4E9X].
58
Josh Jones, The Iconic Urinal & Work of Art, “Fountain,” Wasn’t Created by Marcel
Duchamp But by the Pioneering Dada Artist Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven, OPEN
CULTURE (July 5, 2018), http://www.openculture.com/2018/07/the-iconic-urinal-work-ofart-fountain-wasnt-created-by-marcel-duchamp.html [https://perma.cc/HH2M-PVM2].
59
See Hustvedt, supra note 1.
60
See William A. Camfield, Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain Its History and Aesthetics in
the Context of 1917, 16 DADA/SURREALISM 64 (1987).
61
Id. at 68. Paul B. Franklin, Object Choice: Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain and the Art
of Queer Art History, in 23 OXFORD ART J. 1, 11–12 (2000).
62
Id. Camfield, supra note 60, at 75–79.
63
Camfield, supra note 60, at 75–79. The most important essay was penned by Louise
Norton. Id. at 78–79.
56
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Another notable appraisal confirms the erotic overtones of the
urinal by making the trenchant point that The Fountain emerged
from Duchamp amid public debates over the propriety of installing
pissoirs (public toilets) in Paris.64 Many publicly voiced concerns
that they were being used by gay men for liaisons. 65 The selection
of a urinal for display at a major art exhibition would certainly have
been a criticism of such concerns.66 In a brief 1917 editorial in The
Blind Man, the author argued that the urinal was both vulgar and
plagiarism—asserting that it was merely an unoriginal piece of
plumbing paraphernalia.67 Indeed, these were soundly rejected in
language almost surely approved by Duchamp, one of the editors of
the briefly extant journal.68 It read, in part humorously and entirely
seriously, as follows:
The Richard Mutt Case
They say any artist paying six dollars may exhibit.
Mr. Richard Mutt sent in a fountain. Without
discussion this article disappeared and never was
exhibited.
What were the grounds for refusing Mr. Mutt’s
fountain;
1. Some contended that it was immoral, vulgar.
2. Others It was plagiarism, a plain piece of pluming.
Now Mr. Mutt’s fountain is not immoral, that is
absurd, no more than a bath tub is immoral. It is
64

Franklin, supra note 61, at 25.
Id. at 25.
66
Id. at 31–34.
67
See THE BLIND MAN NO. 2 (May 1917), https://www.toutfait.com/issues/
issue_3/Collections/girst/Blindman2/5.html [https://perma.cc/EDX6-MA3J]. Only two
editions of The Blind Man were published. They appeared in 1917 and were edited by
Marcel Duchamp, Beatrice Wood, and Henri-Pierre Roché. Nick Bennett, The Blind Man,
THE BROOKLYN RAIL (June 2018), https://brooklynrail.org/2018/06/art_books/The-BlindMan [https://perma.cc/H8SL-N76X].
68
Id.
65
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a fixture that you see every day in plumbers’
show windows.
Whether Mr. Mutt with his own hands made the
fountain or not has no importance. He CHOSE it.
He took an ordinary article of life, placed it so that
its useful significance disappeared under the new
title and point of view—created a new thought for
that object.
As for plumbing, that is absurd. The only works of
art America has given are her plumbing and her
bridges.69
Given this variety of interesting analytical structures for
Fountain, it becomes virtually impossible to claim that the work
lacked originality. It also becomes impossible to deny that it is a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work within the meaning of the
Copyright Act—that a “useful article . . . shall be considered a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent
that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”70
While a urinal hanging on the wall in a men’s room or awaiting sale in a plumbing supply store is certainly neither original nor a sculptural work, its character changes when it is placed
back side down on a pedestal for purposes of display in a setting
communicating a variety of artistic, cultural, moral, and humorous perspectives.71
As Justice Thomas noted in the recent case of Star Athletica,
LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., the statute requires the fulfillment of a
two-part test in order to be a sculpture rather than a utilitarian object.
72
The first prong requires that a viewer “be able to look at the useful
article and spot some two- or three-dimensional element that

69
70
71
72

Camfield, supra note 60, at 76.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
See Camfield, supra note 60, at 75–79.
Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017).
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appears to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities.”73 Given
the wide array of perspectives about the possible meaning of The
Fountain, it is difficult to deny that the placement of a urinal in the
“wrong” position in an artistic environment changes its potential
utility into something quite different. Justice Thomas goes on the
opine that the sculptural “feature must be able to exist as its own
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work . . . once it is imagined apart
from the useful article.”74 The same imagination that allows a viewer
to “spot” a sculptural element in the urinal explains why it can be
seen as something separate and apart from the urinal as a functional
item.75 Other famous Duchamp works—Bicycle Wheel and In
Advance of a Broken Arm—fulfill the separability requirements for
similar reasons, since Duchamp’s intention in all of these works
was to remove them from their “ready-made,” typically utilitarian
appearance, and display them in a setting that established them
as artistic works.76

Bicycle Wheel

73

In Advance of the Broken Arm

Id.
Id.
75
Id.
76
The original of this work has been lost, but the replicas pictured here are in the
collection of the Museum of Modern Art. See Marcel Duchamp, Bicycle Wheel, in MUSEUM
OF MOD. ART, https://www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/marcel-duchamp-bicyclewheel-new-york-1951-third-version-after-lost-original-of-1913/ [https://perma.cc/5YVERTAZ]; see also Broken Arm, supra note 22. The Broken Arm piece is typically displayed
hanging from a wire attached to the ceiling so it can rotate with the ambient breezes in the
gallery.
74
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Similar conclusions about originality and artistic qualities apply to Cattelan taping a banana to a wall in The Comedian. Perhaps,
unlike Duchamp, the banana used in that work was not the first
instance in which certain ideas were brought to life. Decaying
materials were used in other art works, though Cattelan’s may have
been the first to use a banana.77 The intentions—pranksterism,
commentary on decay, and critique of extant art movements—were
not new.78 Note that Duchamp’s motivations traveled in similar
arenas: the idea of using decay as a statement about temporality, the
rottenness of contemporary artistic practice, and life and death can
be made evident in an infinite number of ways.79 And, of course,
ideas are not copyrightable; only the expression of ideas is
protected.80 Cattelan simply selected a banana as his expressive
mode. And, like Fountain, the intention was made palpable by
imposing his will upon a tangible object, largely by altering its
location and presentation.81
The artist’s gallerist—Emanuel Perrotin 82—claimed that every
aspect of Comedian was “carefully considered from the shape of the
fruit, to the angle it has been affixed with duct tape to the wall, to its
placement in the booth—front and center, on a large wall that could

77

There is a lengthy tradition of allowing works to rot or decay. Like Cattelan and many
others, Edvard Munch was known for using decaying materials in his work as part of a
commentary on life, death, decay, and temporality. See DAVID A. SCOTT, ART:
AUTHENTICITY, RESTORATION, FORGERY 397 (2016). Or explore Urs Fischer’s candle
sculptures—large wax compositions mimicking famous works that he lights and allows to
melt into puddles over time. See Alice Yoo, Urs Fischer’s Dramatically Melting
Sculptures, MY MODERN MET (May 1, 2012), https://mymodernmet.com/urs-fischermelting-sculptures/ [https://perma.cc/Q5FZ-VKTJ].
78
Perhaps the namesake for much of this was not Duchamp, but Francis Picabia, who
steadfastly made work undercutting extant artistic movements. See Sam Ben-Meir, Francis
Picabia: A Painter for This Moment, GLOB. RSCH. (Feb. 24, 2017),
https://www.globalresearch.ca/francis-picabia-a-painter-for-this-moment/5576545
[https://perma.cc/YSH6-3ZJG].
79
See supra note 77.
80
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
81
See Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010. Though not
discussed here, it also may be true that the combination of a banana with duct tape and a
wall may itself be an original composition. Perhaps the work’s originality arises not just
because Cattelan used a banana, but also tape and a wall.
82
See PERROTIN, https://www.perrotin.com/about [https://perma.cc/8J8H-F29W].
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have easily fit a much larger painting.”83 That statement is
confirmed in the Certificate of Authenticity and Installation
Instructions that are transferred to a buyer when an instance of The
Comedian is sold to a purchaser, allowing the installation of the
work at another location.84 The document contains very precise
instructions on how to effect an installation.85 The Comedian story
is relatively similar to that of the Oscar Wilde photograph labeled as
original in the famous case Burrow-Giles Lithographic Company v.
Sarony.86 According to Justice Miller, the staging of the pose and
background was more than enough to make the photograph
original.87 In addition, it is worth repeating that originality need not
be novel. Just a minimal imposition of human will upon an object
will suffice.88 In these cases, the imposition of will does not need to
be directly on the appearance of the object itself, but on its
placement and in the perceptions its placement generates. 89
Therefore, The Comedian qualifies.

83

Sarah Cascone, Maurizio Cattelan is Taping Bananas to a Wall at Art Basel Miami
Beach and Selling Them for $120,000 Each, ARTNET (Dec. 4, 2019),
https://news.artnet.com/market/maurizio-cattelan-banana-art-basel-miami-beach-1722516
[https://perma.cc/7XFG-E8EA]; see also Jordan Hoffman, ‘It is Something Deeper’: David
Datuna on Why He Ate the $120,000 Banana, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2019/dec/11/david-datuna-120000-bananainterview-art-basel-miami [https://perma.cc/RRV8-PEPQ].
84
See Cascone, supra note 83. Much contemporary art involves a plan for installation
of a work rather than an actual, tangible object. Sol LeWitt is famous for such work. When
such art is sold, the artist conveys a certificate of authenticity to the buyer allowing
installation of the work. For a thorough analysis of the copyright consequences of this
practice, see Richard Chused, “Temporary” Conceptual Art: Property and Copyright,
Hopes and Prayers, 45 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (2019) [hereinafter Chused,
“Temporary” Conceptual Art].
85
Katherine Wisniewski at the gallery was kind enough to sendthe author an unsigned
copy of the Certificate and Instructions. It contains very detailed images with precise
measurements about the placement and taping of the banana on the wall. E-mailfrom
Katherine Wisniewski, Assoc. Dir. Of Commc’n and Mktg., Perrotin, to author (Feb. 20,
2020, 3:31 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter E-mail from Katherine Wisniewski].
86
111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).
87
Id. at 60.
88
See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102–03 (2d Cir. 1951)
(citations omitted). See discussion of Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. and Alfred
Bell v. Catalda, supra notes 34–36.
89
See Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017);
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 53.
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The spectacles on the museum floor were original. Kevin
Nguyen and TJ Khayatan—the two young men who created the
spectacle of spectacles—were quoted by The New York Times as
performing their glasses routine because of the weak quality of what
was on display at the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art:
“Is this really what you call art?” Kevin said in an
interview over the weekend.
TJ added, “We looked at it and we were like, ‘This is
pretty easy. We could make this ourselves.’”90
Their intent was quite similar to that of Duchamp or Cattelan.
They asked highly aesthetic questions about the nature of artistic
endeavors, challenged expectations about what sorts of objects
should be in museums, and wondered with great anticipation what
human reactions would become visible.
In short, Nguyen and Khayatan became artists in a flash. Good
for them! They thought the art they viewed in the museum was
simple minded and pointless.91 Their reaction was to spontaneously mimic the silliness they saw.92 Essentially, they made a parody—
a much more serious form of creativity than mere pranksterism.
It worked like a charm. Museum visitors reacted as if the museum
environment had been altered in a new and provocative way. 93
In short, it hardly was an event without originality—spontaneous
but nonetheless new, instinctive but nonetheless astute, prankish
but nonetheless artistically challenging, funny but nonetheless maddeningly successful.
II. FIXATION: BANANAS

The Copyright Act provides that a work is fixed when “its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of
the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
90
91
92
93

See Mele, supra note 7.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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more than transitory duration.”94 This requirement raises two sets of
questions about Cattelan’s The Comedian. First, Emanuel Perrotin,
Cattelan’s gallerist, claimed that the actual “work” was not really
the banana, but the certificate of authenticity confirming that a
purchaser had the right to install the work by following the
instructions in the certificate on how to do the wall taping. 95 What
does that mean for purposes of fixation and perhaps originality? The
second poses issues closely related in some ways to originality.
Though the Copyright Act does not explicitly require that the artist
or the artist’s agent actually cause the fixation, it certainly may be
read as requiring that such a step be taken. 96 Merely taking a
preexisting object and moving it around, one might think, will not
satisfy the standard. In addition, the banana was in a constant
process of change and decay. Does that mean the piece may never
be fixed? Similarly, what “fixes” The Fountain? And what is it that
was fixed?
A. Certificates of Authenticity and Fixation
As noted, David Datuna un-taped and ate one of Maurizio
Cattelan’s bananas.97 Even Perrotin, Cattelan’s gallerist, took one of
the bananas off the wall and ate it!98 He reportedly said, “Maurizio,
it’s a good banana, I have to say.”99 He went on to claim that in the
absence of a certificate of authenticity, anyone removing a banana
without paying the price owns nothing except a banana digesting in
a belly.100 Sarah Cascone described Perrotin’s explanation of how
this particular composition worked as conceptual art:” In a way,
explained Perrotin, securing a buyer for the piece completed the
artwork. ‘A work like that,’ he said, ‘if you don’t sell the work, it’s

94

17 U.S.C. § 101.
Cascone, supra note 84.
96
17 U.S.C. § 102.
97
See Pogrebin, supra note 2.
98
See Rob Picheta, Someone Ate a $120,000 Banana that an Artist Had Taped to a Wall,
CNN (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/style/article/banana-artwork-eaten-scliintl/index.html [https://perma.cc/2F8S-QM5H].
99
Id.
100
See Cascone, supra note 83.
95
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not a work of art.’”101 Perrotin’s explanation of the work was more
fully explained by Robin Pogrebin:
According to the gallery, Mr. Datuna’s stunt did not
actually destroy the artwork or whatever monetary
value it might have had at that moment. The three
buyers who collectively spent about $390,000 on the
taped fruit had bought the concept of the piece, which
comes with a certificate of authenticity from the
artist, along with installation instructions. It is up to
the owners to secure their own materials from
hardware and grocery stores, and to replace the
banana, if they wish, whenever it rots. After Mr.
Datuna consumed the banana, the gallery taped
another one to the wall.102
The surface implication of this statement is that the actual
banana taped to the wall at Miami Basel was not an artwork at all; it
was just a banana and some tape on a wall. The actual work was the
certificate of authenticity and its accompanying instruction set.103
That is difficult to accept. Art comes and goes with great regularity.
Many works are intended to be temporary. Eliasson’s Waterfalls, for
example, were intended by all concerned to be temporary; and they
were taken down after a time.104 The fixation requirement certainly
does not require absolute permanence.

101

Id.
See Pogrebin, supra note 2.
103
This sort of arrangement with a certificate and instructions is a typical arrangement
for many pieces of conceptual art. See, e.g., Chused, “Temporary” Conceptual Art, supra
note 84, at 10–12. For an analysis of some of the consequences of this practice for works
by Sol LeWitt, see id. at 1.
104
Olafur Eliasson, The New York City Waterfalls, in PUB. ART FUND,
https://www.publicartfund.org/exhibitions/view/the-new-york-city-waterfalls/
[https://perma.cc/48CB-AHHQ]. Another well-known example was a striking installation
in Central Park—The Gates—by Cristo. It was constructed during the winter of 2005 and
remained up only for two weeks in February. The Gates, in CHRISTO AND JEAN-CLAUDE,
http://christojeanneclaude.net/projects/the-gates [https://perma.cc/BDS7-K5ZC]. 7,503
orange draped gates were built over paths throughout the park. Id. The barren winter trees
allowed park strollers to see the bright orange gates far into the distance as paths ascended
and descended upon hillsides. The experience of walking through The Gates was
breathtaking.
102
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Many works by artists such as Sol LeWitt, Donald Judd, Dan
Flavin, and others are sold the same way.105 Cattelan transferred
three copies of The Comedian at Miami Basel.106 In each case,
purchase of a certificate and an instruction set was the sine qua non
of ownership, allowing the work to be installed and uninstalled in
the preferred time frame of the owner.107 In most of these cases, the
artists presumably retained a copyright in the certificate and
instructions. And the documents usually contained a drawing of the
work and/or expressed how to complete the installation. 108 This
means the creator of the idea and composition described in the
certificate and instruction document, itself copyrighted, or the
creator’s successor in interest, must also be consulted before an
installation is approved. In short, the certificate and instruction set
typically only gives authority to pursue permission to install, not
actually to do it unilaterally.109
In reality, the ownership structure may be complex after the
transfer of a conceptual artwork like The Comedian. Each of the
three purchasers obtained a non-intellectual property right—a
typical tangible property right—in the certificate and instruction
document.110 But a copyright was retained by the artist in those same
documents since they were expressive, original, and fixed. 111 When
the work is installed, it becomes a derivative work of the original
expression in the certificate and instructions.112 The Act defines such
a work as one:

105

See Chused, “Temporary” Conceptual Art, supra note 84, at 2–4; Graham Bowley,
It’s a Banana, It’s Art. And Now It’s the Guggenheim’s Problem., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/arts/design/banana-art-guggenheim.html
[https://perma.cc/8H4H-NNYF].
106
See Pogrebin, supra note 2.
107
See id.
108
There is no formal copyright notice on the certificate of authenticity and instructions
for The Comedian, but it does contain a series of detailed color diagrams of a property
installation and clearly meets both the originality and fixation requirements. See E-mail
from Katherine Wisniewski, supra note 85. Cattelan surely holds a copyright in the
document.
109
See Chused, “Temporary” Conceptual Art, supra note 84, at 2.
110
See 17 U.S.C. § 202; Pogrebin, supra note 2.
111
17 U.S.C. §102.
112
17 U.S.C. §101.
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[B]ased upon one or more preexisting works, such
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting
of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or
other modifications which, as a whole, represent
an original work of authorship, is a “derivative
work.”113
For purposes of this Article, it is critically important to recognize
that an installation is a recasting or an adaptation of the original
work as expressed in the certificate of authenticity and instructions.
Note that installing a derivative work requires permission of the
original creator.114 The original author must be consulted because
all derivative works reuse part or all of the original work. In
addition, the derivative work only gains protection for the new
material it adds to the original; it does not diminish or alter the force
of the original copyright.115 That perfectly describes an installed
conceptual artwork like The Comedian.
But things may quickly become complicated once we get past
the clear-cut part of the copyright structure. The intellectual property
rights in a physical, derivative manifestation of the work could be
held by a variety of different people, either individually or jointly,
depending upon who installed the work. 116 The artist may hold the
copyright in the derivative work, as well as that in the certificate of
authenticity, if the artist participated in fabricating and installing
it.117 The installers may instead own that interest if the artist did not
directly supervise their work.118 Or perhaps the person owning the
certificate and instruction document, if given free reign by the artist

113

Id.
Matt Knight, Using Another Author’s Work—Is Your Derivative Work Infringing
Someone’s Copyright?, SIDEBAR SATURDAYS (Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.sidebar
saturdays.com/2019/08/10/derivative-works/ [https://perma.cc/7MNK-WWFK].
115
17 U.S.C. §103(b).
116
See 17 U.S.C. § 103; Knight, supra note 114.
117
See Knight, supra note 114.
118
Id.
114
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or the artist’s successor to proceed with the installation, may be the
author of the derivative work.119 In short, ownership can quickly
become multi-faceted. None of this undermines the validity of the
copyright held by the artist in the certificate and instructions or the
recognition that a particular installation may carry its own copyright
as a derivative work.
Therefore, if a work is expressive and contains enough changes
from the instructions to be original, copyrights will almost always
exist in both the certificate and instructions as well as in an installed
version of the work.120 Consequently, Perrotin’s statement that the
work was not art until its purchase was misleading, if not simply
wrong. For copyright purposes, the certificate and instruction
documents almost always satisfy the originality, expression, and
fixation requirements. The installed manifestations of those
documents also meet those requirements. They are “recast,
transformed, or adapted”121 from the documents, and they too are
original and expressive. Many of these works manifest themselves
differently from installation to installation, depending on the setting
in which they are mounted. Sol LeWitt’s wall drawings, for
example, vary in appearance depending on the size of the walls
used.122 And in Cattelan’s case, mere change of the room
environment will force decisions to be made about exactly where to
tape the banana to the wall, about which to banana to use, about the
length of the pieces of tape to use given the size of the fruit,123 and
perhaps the color to paint the wall. An installation is not an
automatic or routinely composed work.124 This analysis also means
119

Id.
See 17 U.S.C. §103.
121
17 U.S.C. § 101.
122
See Chused, “Temporary” Conceptual Art, supra note 84, at 22.
123
The instructions provide “about” 20 centimeters when measuring the first piece of
tape. E-mail from Katherine Wisniewski, supra note 85. If a very large banana is used, a
slightly longer piece could presumably be used. Similarly, the wall color is not prescribed,
though the height from the floor and angle of the tape is expressed using “about” again. Id.
The angle of the banana, of course, is impossible to precisely measure. And the instructions
suggest that the fruit be changed every seven to ten days. Id. These directions leave enough
room for an installer to make independent judgments about the work each time it is placed
on a wall, allowing an original derivative copyright to exist.
124
For a much lengthier analysis of the copyright issues involved in installing a work of
conceptual art, see Chused, “Temporary” Conceptual Art, supra note 84.
120
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that the important fixation questions in The Comedian are not about
the certificate and instruction documents. They clearly are fixed in
a tangible means of expression. But, as elucidated in the next
section, there still may be questions about whether installed, visible,
and derivative versions of the work are fixed, even if we assume
they are original and expressive.
B. Object Relocation and Decay
As with originality, the only aspect of installed banana-style
works that may be fixed is the movement of objects into a place
of public display. But why should that not qualify as fixation, at
least some of the time? The standard should be that if the movement of a preexisting, fixed object to a new place was original,
then fixation has occurred. The underlying explanation is fairly
simple. Certainly, placing everyday objects into large compositions
satisfies the requirement.

Robert Rauschenberg, Canyon (1959)
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Consider Robert Rauschenberg’s influential compositions—
combining painting, collage, and assemblage. 125 His important
and markedly creative 1959 work Canyon is both a prime and
historically important example.126
Though the stuffed eagle in Canyon had no particularly artistic
value when on a shelf in a taxidermy shop, it took on compelling
artistic force when it was incorporated into a large combine.
Rauschenberg’s intent was to create a three-dimensional composition.127 Its placement in the larger work was aesthetic in intent.
The bird became part of a fixed work. While some may think that
the eagle itself is not fixed for copyright purposes, 128 it obtained that
status by Rauschenberg’s placement of the object into a large
composition. As with artistic intention, relocation of an everyday
object often will bestow both originality and fixation upon it.
Though the placements of Duchamp’s urinal and Cattelan’s
banana in new locations were not part of larger compositional works
like Rauschenberg’s combines, the artists’ intentions were similarly
aesthetic. Moreover, the placements were entirely original. It would
be odd if the placement of a preexisting object in a combine is
statutorily construed as fixed while its placement in a novel gallery
setting is not. In both cases, new compositions were created. In the
single object placement cases, the gallery locations create dramatically new environments for the works. The process is quite similar
to the composition of Rothko’s Chapel at the Menil Collection,
Monet’s Water Lilies at the Musée de l’Orangerie, or Nevelson’s
constructions. It was the placement of each individual painting or
sculptural element, not just their individual, tangible status, that was
part of their copyright fixation.

125

Robert Rauschenberg, Combines, CENTRE POMIDOU (1953), http://mediation.centre
pompidou.fr/education/ressources/ENS-Rauschenberg-EN/ENS-rauschenberg-EN.htm
[https://perma.cc/2EHJ-NYWZ].
126
The text image is on the site of the Museum of Modern Art. Robert Rauschenberg,
MUSEUM OF MOD. ART (1959), https://www.moma.org/collection/works/165011
[https://perma.cc/6425-FDKZ].
127
It may, for example, not be original. The eagle preexisted its stuffing and preservation.
Nothing about the object itself was particularly new or creative.
128
Given the author’s position about fixation of The Fountain, however, the author
believes the eagle could be fixed if it is used by itself for artistic purposes.
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This idea also applies to both The Fountain and the spectacles
on the floor of the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art. Once
intentionally placed in an aesthetically interesting location, the spectacles became fixed as copyrightable sculptural works. And the newly located objects need not be in their places of fixation for very
long. The requirement that a work be fixed for “a period of more
than transitory duration” imposes a very short-term limitation.129
If presence of software in a computer’s volatile memory is a fixed
copy of a protected work,130 then certainly the urinal and spectacles
fulfill that element of the fixation requirement.
A more challenging issue is raised when objects used in a work
either constantly change while on display or change in one dramatic
moment. Such projects were and are part of a large cultural set of
artistic endeavors exploring the relationships between stability and
instability, life and death, and permanence and impermanence.
Instability was, of course, a major copyright problem with The
Comedian. A banana, whether on a tree ripening, in a bowl waiting
to be eaten, or on a wall decaying, constantly changes. Cattelan’s
work, in a biological sense, was never totally stable.
The definition of fixation creates significant ambiguity in
settings involving changing works. The Copyright Act defines a
fixed work as one that is “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit
it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration.”131 This definition assumes
the possibility that some art objects will change over time. They
are only required to be “sufficiently permanent or stable,” not just

129

17 U.S.C. § 101. As noted at the outset of this Article, the original version of The
Fountain disappeared shortly after it was photographed by Alfred Stieglitz. Though it
existed for only a short time, that certainly met the duration requirement. See Marcek
Duchamp and the Fountain Scandal, PHILA. MUSEUM OF ART (Mar. 27, 2017),
https://press.philamuseum.org/marcel.org/marcel-duchamp-and-the-fountain-scandal/
[https://perma.cc/7A7V-4RYV].
130
See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993)
(involving the protection of a computer program when it is moved from a storage device
into memory, which empties out when the program is shut down or the computer is turned
off).
131
17 U.S.C. § 101.
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permanent or stable, to be perceptible or communicated. 132 Pure
permanence is not part of the definition. The underlying problem
concerns the potential meaning of this standard in different varieties
of change situations— ones where alteration occurs so slowly that
people do not perceive the change or where transformations are
continuously obvious to the human eye. Discussion of four examples will facilitate working through the problems of fixation and
instability—the use of evanescent paints in many well-known
art works,133 Urs Fischer’s burning candle sculptures, 134 Olafur
Eliasson’s 2008 installation of Waterfalls on the East River in New
York City,135 and Banksy’s shredding of Girl with Balloon at
Sotheby’s in London in 2018.136 In each of these situations there was
ongoing or sudden alteration in the nature of an artistic composition.

Vincent Van Gogh, Roses (1890)
132

Id.; see also Dawn Leung, A Fixation on Moral Rights: The Implications of Kelley v.
Chicago Park District for Copyright and VARA Protection, 4 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
1, 22 (2014).
133
See Sophie Haigney, ‘The Scream’ is Fading. New Research Reveals Why., N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/arts/design/the-screamedvard-munch-science.html [https://perma.cc/UU5V-GYYW]; see infra pp. 198-99.
134
See Yoo, supra note 77.
135
See The New York City Waterfalls, supra note 104. See infra pp. 202-03.
136
See Greg Kumparak, Banksy Piece Immediately Shreds Itself After Being Sold for
$1.1M, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 6, 2018, 1:48PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/10/06/banksypiece-immediately-shreds-itself-after-being-sold-for-1-25m/
[https://perma.cc/38ESEV78]; see infra pp. 208-10.
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Much of the problem dissolves when considered as a matter of
day to day reality. All things on earth change constantly, some
quickly and some quite slowly. All art works, even the most iconic
paintings, are in a constant process of decay. Conservation efforts
may return a composition to its original appearance in large part, but
the original work is never fully restored. 137 Among the most noted
examples are some of the works of Vincent Van Gogh—especially
his pink rose compositions.138 He often used a blush pink pigment—
red lake—that is notorious for its highly fugitive hue.139 The blooms
in the 1890 painting entitled Roses, pictured above, held by the
Metropolitan Museum of Art.140, originally were brightly colored.
It would be shocking if Van Gogh’s works were recently created
and then denied copyright protection because of anticipation that the
paint pigments would degrade, especially when exposed to light.
Natural, slow moving changes are inherent in all works of art, indeed
of all things on earth. The legal status of the objects should not be
altered when an artist makes this natural process an overt element of
an artistic work rather than a “hidden” progression buried in the
nature of the materials used.
The issues are a bit more difficult when the processes of change
or decay are so obvious, continuous, or intentional that virtually
anyone can perceive that something is happening. That may be true
of The Comedian, though decay of the banana is not actually
137

There are a number of other very well-known painters whose works have similar
problems. For a recent survey of these painters, see Haigney, supra note 133.
138
Id. In addition to work by Munch, Haigney also mentions Van Gogh’s The
Bedroom (1889), in which purples have faded to blues, and other artists like Matisse.
Id.
139
See Sarah Everts, Van Gogh’s Fading Colors Inspire Scientific Inquiry, CHEM. &
ENG’G NEWS (Feb. 1, 2016), https://cen.acs.org/articles/94/i5/Van-Goghs-Fading-ColorsInspire.html [https://perma.cc/2G5E-RCCE]. Id.
140
This public domain image is available online. . See Roses by Vincent Van Gogh,
available at METRO. MUSEUM OF ART, https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection
/search/436534https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/436534 [https://perma
.cc/PW6P-9BE4]. Museum investigations discovered traces of the original color at various
locations on the canvas. For more information on Van Gogh’s color longevity issues, see
Nina Siegal, Van Gogh’s True Palette Revealed, N.Y. TIMES, ( Apr. 29, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/arts/30iht-vangogh30.html [https://perma.cc/FUF9FVQR].
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perceived moment to moment. It enters our thought processes
because of what we know about bananas. A recent example that is
quite similar to The Comedian is a work by Darren Bader consisting
of forty pieces of vegetables and fruit that was exhibited this year at
the Whitney Museum in New York.141 As shown in the image below,
they were placed on pedestals like Duchamp’s Fountain. The food
items were “sourced and refreshed from a weekly Fresh Direct
delivery and regular trips to a nearby Chelsea fruit market.” 142 In
fact, the decay of fruit on public display is not dramatically different
from the loss of vibrancy in Van Gogh’s pigments. The change just
occurs somewhat more rapidly.143

Darren Bader, Fruits, Vegetables; Fruit and Vegetable Salad as displayed
at the Whitney Museum in 2020.144
141

See Darren Bader, Fruits, Vegetables; Fruit and Vegetable Salad, WHITNEY MUSEUM
AM. ART, https://whitney.org/exhibitions/fruits-vegetables [https://perma.cc/8VQ4CQD2].
142
See Bowley, supra note 105; see also id.
143
Museums owning certificates and instructions for conceptual art or installed versions
of such works that decay over time have particularly challenging conservation issues. For
example, an instance of Cattelan’s The Comedian is owned by the Guggenheim Museum
in New York. Id. Other museums own works consisting of fluorescent tubes installed in
accordance with instructions created by Dan Flavin. Id. What is appropriate conservation
action when one of the tubes starts to flicker? For discussion of these and a number of other
examples, see id.
144
See Bader, supra note 141.
OF
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Urs Fischer’s candle sculptures provide another example. They
are among the most notable and pertinent artistic compositions
exhibiting change. Fischer duplicates famous old sculptures or
constructs more modern human figures in large wax forms and
places wicks through them extending from the tops so they can be
lit.145 After being displayed as obviously fixed wax works, the large
candles are lit. The works then degrade into puddles and chunks of
fallen wax.146 The process may take a significant period of time. The
“candles” typically are quite large. Here, rather than raising issues
of natural decay or rot over time, Fischer makes the process overt.
Certainly, an audio-visual work of the melting process would be
protected. But what about a particular moment when the melting
piece is seen by a gallery visitor?
Thought of as a process, the burning candle is no different from
Van Gogh’s red lake paint degrading or Cattelan’s banana rotting.
Thinking of it as an intellectual process, however, does create a
difference. The artistic intentions of Van Gogh and Fischer were
hardly the same. However, both artists intended to embody a
creative work in a form that was easily perceived as both aesthetic
and stable at the moment of viewing. The presence of burning wicks
may change our imagination as we view a Fischer piece, but at the
moment of observation, the candles typically appear just as stable as
a painting. While we know candles melt, we don’t typically perceive
the decay process at most moments or in short viewing intervals

145

See Pinar Noorata, Classic Sculpture Replica Is a Giant Melting Candle, MY MOD
MET (July 2, 2012), https://mymodernmet.com/urs-fischer-the-rape-of-the-sabine-womenuntitled [https://perma.cc/M3V3-DJPK]; see also Yoo, supra note 77.
146
See Yoo, supra note 77. Yoo’s article contains pictures of one of his most famous
wax-candle works mimicking Giambologna’s 16th-century sculpture The Rape of the
Sabine Women at various stages of its melting away. Id. It melted at the Venice Biennale
in 2011. Id. The Whitney Museum had another of his works melt, which depicted a man
facing a mirror so “he” could “watch” himself melt! See Jerry Saltz, This 8-Foot Candle
Portrait Mesmerized Me, VULTURE (May 17, 2016), http://www.vulture.com/2016/05/ursfischer-julian-schnabel-wax-sculpture.html [https://perma.cc/TT5B-YEJ2].
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even when the wicks are visibly lit.147 And only a short period of
time is necessary to fulfill the statutory fixation definition.148
The issues get more difficult with works that overtly embody
constant and continuous change in ways we cannot help but
perceive. Olafur Eliasson’s Waterfalls and Banksy’s shredding
caper are good illustrations. For both, alterations in appearance were
obvious to all viewers. With a grant from the Public Art Fund in
New York City, Eliasson arranged for the construction of four large
scaffolds from 90 to 120 feet tall in the East River between Brooklyn
and Governors Island south of Manhattan.149 A system was built on
each scaffold that pumped water up to the top where it cascaded
back down into the river.150 Special Circle Line tour boats ran
frequent trips allowing close up visits to each of the four artificial
waterfalls.151 The most notable of the four, located under the
Brooklyn Bridge, is displayed below. 152 The falls were lit up,
making night visits especially stunning. As with Fischer’s work,
here too an audio-visual recording of one of the waterfalls in
operation was copyrightable, but short of that do other sorts of
intellectual property rights attach? Obviously, the installation was
never stable moment to moment when operating. And the change
was neither natural, as with a Van Gogh painting, nor extremely
slow as in a Fischer “candle.” We perceive the water’s rapid,
downward movement constantly. Does that mean it was not fixed
unless the supporting scaffold and water systems were original
sculptural works? Finding fixation, at least while the waterfalls were
in operation, seems problematic, at least initially.

147

There, of course, may be moments when the burning process leads to chunks of the
candle falling to the ground. Stability obviously is lost at such times, but it is quickly
restored once the moment passes.
148
See 17 U.S.C. § 101. It cannot be a performance without a fixation. Someone would
have to make an audio-visual fixation of the candle decay for a performance to become
copyrightable.
149
The New York City Waterfalls, supra note 104.
150
Id.
151
Conrad Mulcahy, Guide to Viewing the Waterfalls, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/arts/design/27bwate.html [https://perma.cc/5P3XN2RR].
152
The author shot this image while having dinner at the South Street Seaport on the
Manhattan side of the East River just south of the Brooklyn Bridge.
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The Waterfalls was similar to Mud Muse—another Robert
Rauschenberg work that was reconstructed in 2017 for a large
retrospective exhibition of his work at the Museum of Modern Art
in New York.153 Mud Muse, originally on display from 1968 to
1971,154 was a large vat filled with 8,000 pounds of mud that
constantly bubbled in response to the sounds of whatever music was
being played at the time.155 As with the structures behind Eliasson’s
waterfalls, the vat, mud, mechanical, and electronic equipment were
clearly fixed. They might even be deemed an artwork, at least in
part. A vat of mud plays a similar role as Eliasson’s structures. But
when turned on, the mud was in constant motion and the sounds of
153

See Robert Rauschenberg: Among Friends, MUSEUM OF MOD. ART,
https://www.moma.org/audio/playlist/40/655 [https://perma.cc/2H2F-ZGT4].
154
Id.
155
Id. The author recorded a brief video of the installation while visiting the
retrospective. The image in the text is a still from the video. When experiencing the work,
the sounds, aroma, and bubbles were mesmerizing. See also Julia Halperin,
Rauschenberg’s Musical Machine: The Story Behind the 8,000 Pounds of Mud Inside
MoMA, ARTNET NEWS (May 12, 2017), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/robertrauschenberg-mud-moma-958310 [https://perma.cc/DXE4-EQQA].
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bubbles popping and mud plopping back into the vat were quite
audible. Those characteristics are visually discernible even in a
single image like the one below.

So, what would happen if another person replicated the work of
either Eliasson or Rauschenberg? Would that be infringing? Is
constant perceptible motion or change ever fixed? If the overall form
is clear, the realm of motion is limited in its spatial realm, and the
range of motion is clearly perceptible in its general appearance, why
should that be treated differently from Van Gogh’s decaying paint,
Fischer’s slow candle burns, or the decay of a banana? The overall
form, shape, range of motion, and impact on our senses of these
works is quite clear. All are “fixed” in our minds and the memory
lasts for a significant period of time. It is not like a car speeding
along a thruway that has no artistic pretensions. The intention of the
creators is clearly aesthetic. It is better policy—both from the
wording of the fixation definition and from aesthetic notions of
artmaking not to treat the word “fixed” to mean unchanging. This is
clear when considering the Van Gogh paintings. As with much of
the artistic world, the outer limits of the word’s meaning must be
related, not only to the intentions of the artist but also to the human
mind’s capacity to perceive what is happening within a defined
range of action.
Deeply important changes in our physical perceptions and
understandings of the world can help us understand why Eliasson’s
Waterfalls and Rauschenberg’s Mud Muse were fixed in a tangible
medium of expression. The mathematical and scientific concept of
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“chaos” is an important analogy. In the scientific context, “chaos”
signifies a phenomenon that visually appears random but responds
to established mathematical limits that vary in outcome depending
on even very slight differences in initial conditions.156 Chaotic
processes often are bounded in their outer limits despite our inability
to predict exactly what will happen next.157 In many ways, chaos
defines art works like those displaying water descending from the
top of a structure or bubbles percolating in a vat. A camera, or even
our brains, can capture any moment, but we cannot predict precisely
what will happen next.
Given “chaos’s” inherent natural variability, the well-defined
nature of the mathematical concept, and the ability to capture any
particular moment—why not allow an artistic use of bounded
randomness, in addition to items that appear stable at the moment of
viewing, to be fixed? The underlying artistic intention is just as
inventive, creative, and perceptible—maybe more so—as it is in art
works generally deemed “stable” despite their changing characteristics. Eliasson’s water structures and Rauschenberg’s Mud Muse
should be deemed copyrightable as changing, but bounded, works.
They are among the most inventive and unusual works in the history
of contemporary art. It would be unacceptable to allow anyone to
come along and freely duplicate their work.
These ideas strongly suggest that Kelley v. Chicago Park
District158 was incorrectly decided.159 The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the garden Wildflower Works
was not eligible for copyright protection on authorship and fixation
grounds.160 Designed by Chapman Kelley for Grant Park in Chicago, the garden included carefully selected, seasonal wildflowers
156

See generally JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (2008); see also
Jonathan Borwein & Michael Rose, Explainer: What is Chaos Theory?, THE
CONVERSATION (Nov. 18, 2012, 10:20 PM), https://theconversation.com/explainer-whatis-chaos-theory-10620 [https://perma.cc/GX5J-CMT7].
157
See id.
158
635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).
159
Others also have suggested that the court was wrong. See Leung, supra note 132132,
at 16–18, 20–30; Michelle Chatelain, Copyright Protection of a Garden: Kelley v. Chicago
Park District Holds that Gardens Are Not Artwork Subject to Intellectual Property
Protection, 14 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 385, 392–94 (2011).
160
See Kelley, 635 F.3d at 306.
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planted in distinct and limited plots.161 The court noted that authorship must entirely be a result of human endeavor and fixation must
be authored.162 The growth of plant life, the court said, was not
authored but “planted and cultivated;” and its growth and change
over time reduced stability to the point of breaking fixation.163
While diagrams and plans for the garden were protected, the garden
itself was neither a product of an author nor a fixed work. 164
The court’s result barred Kelley from making moral rights claims
when the park district tore up the garden to implement a different
landscape plan.165
The conclusions about both authorship and fixation in Kelley
were deeply wrong. The basic idea of the garden was not only laid
out in “authored” planning documents, but also dutifully maintained
within set limits and planting schedules by volunteers working
under park authority issued permits.166 Just as Rauschenberg’s
Mud Muse and Eliasson’s artificial waterfalls were confined
within bounded limits, so too was the garden confined within
established planting boundary lines, growing seasons, and color
arrangements.167

161

Id. at 293.
Id. at 303–04.
163
Id. at 304.
164
Id. at 305.
165
Id. at 306.
166
Id. at 294. The permits eventually expired but maintenance of the installation was
allowed to continue without formal permits.
167
Id. at 292–93.
162
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The court’s line drawing in Kelley was therefore improper. The
trial court made analogies to Calder mobiles and Jeff Koons’
Puppy,168 pictured above.169 Unfortunately, both comparisons were
deemed inapposite by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals:
Though not addressing the requirement of fixation
directly, the district court compared Wildflower
Works to “[t]he mobiles of Alexander Calder” and
“Jeff Koons’ ‘Puppy,’ a 43–foot flowering topiary.”
These analogies are also inapt. Although the
aesthetic effect of a Calder mobile is attributable in
part to its subtle movement in response to air
currents, the mobile itself is obviously fixed and
stable. In “Puppy” the artist assembled a huge metal
frame in the shape of a puppy and covered it with
thousands of blooming flowers sustained by an
irrigation system within the frame. This may be

168

Id.at 305.
The author took this picture while visiting the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao in June
2006, while the Koons piece was temporarily installed in front of the museum.
169
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sufficient fixation for copyright (we venture no
opinion on the question), but Wildflower Works
is quite different. It is quintessentially a garden;
“Puppy” is not.170
Denying the centrality of motion to the widespread appeal of
Calder mobiles misses the primary thrust of those works. Motion is
intrinsic to Calder’s expressive drive 171 and cannot blithely be
dismissed as lacking authorship or fixation. The same is true of
Koons’ Puppy. Creating a huge, playful figure with irrigated,
flowering pots over its entire surface was what gave the piece its
aura of friskiness, change, and humor.172 The flowers were not a
minor part of the scheme; they were central to the aesthetic goals.
Motion and change are the heart and soul of both the authorship and
the sufficiently stable fixation within bounded limits of both the
Calder and Koons works, as well as Kelley’s garden.
What about Banksy’s shredding prank? Rather than presenting
a constant process of bounded change, the decisive alteration in the
original two-dimensional work was sudden, surprising, and totally
unexpected.173 There was nothing subtle or gradual about it. At the
conclusion of the bidding, someone from Banksy’s shop used a
remote control to activate the shredder buried in the frame of the art,
cutting the two-dimensional artwork into strips running about
halfway up the piece, and leaving the strips hanging out of the
bottom of the frame.174 This only took a few seconds.175 Girl with
Balloon suddenly was transformed before a live audience. Video of
the event displays a variety of audience reactions—laughter,

170

Kelley, 635 F.3d at 305–06 (citations omitted).
See Rachel Corbett, What Alexander Calder Understood About Joy: America’s
Greatest Sculptor Gave Objects a Playful Life of Their Own, THE ATLANTIC (May 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive//05/alexander-calder-jed-perl/609100/Jul
[https://perma.cc/P2MU-NQ7D].
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See At the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, Jeff Koons’ Puppy Gets a Colorful New Coat,
GUGGENHEIM: NEWS (June 21, 2018), https://www.guggenheim.org/news/bilbao-jeffkoons-puppy[https://perma.cc/Z6N5-JS55].
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See Kumparak, supra note 136.
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amazement, surprise, horror, and disbelief. 176 The half-shredded
work eventually was renamed, authenticated by Banksy’s Pest
Control website as a new work entitled Love is in the Bin, and
accepted by the winning auction bidder for the same price she
offered for Girl with Balloon.177 There was a virtually dichotomous
before and after. The after was dramatically changed in appearance
and form from the before. Putting aside the possible tort causes of
action that the auction winner may have had for damage to her
property,178 two different art works were at issue. Each was original
and fixed. But what about the presence and use of the shredder inside
the frame? Was that integral to the original fixation of either or both
works? The shredder surely was fixed in a tangible medium—either
by thinking of the physical shredder itself or its placement inside the
frame. That was so for both the before and the after.
Below is an image of the half-shredded work. 179 After the
auction Banksy released a video of the shredder being installed
inside the frame of Girl with Balloon.180 An image from the video is
below.181 Another Banksy video showed a test of the system in
which an image was completely shredded. 182 It is therefore possible
that the device malfunctioned at Sotheby’s. Or perhaps the shredder
was turned off using a remote control, or maybe never intended to
176

Banksy Painting ‘Self-Destructs’ After Sotheby’s Sale, CNBC (Oct. 8, 2018, 12:20
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2018/10/08/banksy-painting-self-destructs-aftersothebys-sale.html [https://perma.cc/N26N-53JY].
177
See Scott Reyburn, Winning Bidder for Shredded Banksy Says She’ll Keep It, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/arts/design/winning-bidderfor-shredded-banksy-painting-says-shell-keep-it.html [https://perma.cc/DGB5-829A].
178
The standard auction rule is that property ownership shifts at the banging of the gavel
at the end of bidding. See U.C.C. § 2–328(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002);
Tichy, supra note 5.
179
Jonathan Jones, What Happened Next? How Banksy’s Shredder Proved He Is a
Serious, Important Artist, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2018, 1:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/18/banksy-self-destructing-masterpieceprank-important-artist [https://perma.cc/WKS6-THHL].
180
Bendor Grosvenor, Shredding Banksy, ART HIST. NEWS (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://www.arthistorynews.com/articles/5303_Shredding_Banksy [https://perma.cc/QK
Y2-VU34].
181
Id.
182
Banksy Reveals He to Shred Entire £1m Girl with Balloon Painting, SKY NEWS (Oct.
18, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://news.sky.com/story/banksy-reveals-he-meant-to-shredentire-1m-girl-with-balloon-painting-11528598 [https://perma.cc/U2XQ-ZB6Q].
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fully shred the work in public. If the shredder was turned off, can
it be reactivated at a later date?183 What were the consequences for
copyrightability? Certainly, the before and after versions were fixed
in a tangible medium of expression. But what was and is the status
of the shredder? Was that mechanical device part of an item of
protectable “art?”

III. PICTORIAL, GRAPHIC, AND SCULPTURAL WORKS: SHREDDERS

Copyright terms of art are notoriously flexible and subject to
interpretation, even when defined in the Act. This is clearly revealed
in the previous discussion of originality and fixation.184 It is also true

183
184

See id.
See supra Parts I–II.
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with copyrightable works styled as “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.” On its face, the definition is slippery and puzzling:
“Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” include
two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of
fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and
art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams,
models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans. Such works shall include works of
artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not
their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned;
the design of a useful article, as defined in this
section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that,
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of,
the utilitarian aspects of the article.185
The definition of a “useful article” also has its ambiguities:
A “useful article” is an article having an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the
appearance of the article or to convey information.
An article that is normally a part of a useful article is
considered a “useful article”.186
In combination, these code provisions place Banksy’s shredder
in an interesting, indefinite, and perhaps unique, position. While the
original Girl with Balloon and the post-shredding Love is in the Bin
compositions are clearly works of fine art, the statutory definitions
leave the shredder in an ambiguous place. After insertion in the
frame, the shredder certainly lost whatever intrinsic utilitarian
function it once had as a device for protecting access to private
information, though it does retain at least some of its status as a
mechanical device. This may or may not allow it to be treated as part
of the art object. If the shredder is part of the “form” of the artistic
endeavors, rather than simply a “mechanical or utilitarian aspect” of

185
186

17 U.S.C. § 101.
Id.
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the works, then it might be considered an aspect of the fine art.
But it also may easily be considered an aspect separable from the
two-dimensional before and after works, and therefore not part of
the protected pictorial creations. It may simply be analogous to a
paintbrush—an implement used to create a work rather than an
artistic element of the work. It is important to know whether the
shredder is part of the artistic work. If the auction winner elects to
remove the device from the frame, would that be a mutilation of a
work of fine art and therefore a possible moral right violation?187
If the shredder can be reactivated by use of a remote control, what
are the consequences of deactivating any part of the shredder device
that might receive a remote signal in the future?
So, what is the shredder? Compare it first to Alexander Calder’s
Circus, constructed between 1926 and 1931 and sometimes on
display at the Whitney Museum of Art in New York City, the
work’s owner.188 The Circus is an elaborate set of circus characters
and “acts” that can be animated by hand like children’s toys.189
Even the trapeze artists can be sent swinging.190 It is much like a
dance performance, only the performances involve human
interaction. The similarity between Calder’s work and choreography, all by itself, strongly suggests that works by the master
of mechanical movements should be protected.191 The art world

187

See 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
The image below is from Calder’s Circus by Alexander Calder, available at WHITNEY
MUSEUM OF AM. ART, https://whitney.org/collection/works/5488[https://perma.cc/D3RE38FX]. Visit Alexander Calder, Calder’s Circus, 1926-31, WHITNEY MUSEUM OF AM. ART
at https://www.whitney.org/WatchAndListen/1094 [https://perma.cc/E5FM-GVKK] for a
video about the work.
189
A famous video in the Whitney Museum collection captures Calder “playing” with
the circus. Whitney Museum of Am. Art, Alexander Calder performs his “Circus”,
YOUTUBE
(Oct.
23,
2008),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t6jwnu8Izy0
[https://perma.cc/A25C-UBB9]. However, the circus has rarely been “played” with
recently because of the fragility of the sculpture. Conserving Calder’s Circus, WHITNEY
MUSEUM OF AM. ART (May 22, 2013), https://whitney.org/media/299
[https://perma.cc/8DJT-PEW9].
190
Alexander Calder performs his “Circus”, infra note 193.
191
The Copyright Act specifically lists choreographic works as a category of
copyrightable subject matter. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4).
188
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certainly considers this work to be an elaborate sculptural work, 192
whether it is sit-ting still or suddenly activated by humans. Indeed,
it is considered a major artistic breakthrough, allowing moving
objects to be considered as first-rate creative projects. Calder began
to fabricate mobiles just after he made the Circus.193 It is an early
example of a now large genre known as kinetic art.194 His mobiles,
of course, are in the same category, as are Eliasson’s Waterfalls and
Rauschenberg’s mud bubbles.195
In each setting, similar questions can be posed about whether the
mechanical aspects of the works are part of the protected pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural creations. Most of the mechanisms are not
separable from the rest of the art. They energize the works. Without
them the circus, waterfalls, and mud vat would be wholly different
from the items seen by the public. Mechanical devices were intrinsic
to the function, aesthetics, and appearance of each work. Removing
them would have effectively destroyed the reasons for their creation.
Can that be said of the shredder?
Yes and no. It depends on how one defines the original work.
Before the shredding occurred, the work appeared as permanent and
unchangeable, as prints typically are. Banksy, however, always saw
the piece as alterable, if not destructible.196 Whose perception does
copyright law privilege?197 Given the basic run of ideas suggested to
this point in the Article, artistic intention likely controls the
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See Corbett, supra note 171. See also Adam Gopnik, How Alexander Calder Made
Art Move, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2017/12/04/how-alexander-calder-made-art-move
[https://perma.cc/GYX27ZRD].
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See Calder’s Work, CALDER FOUNDATION, http://www.calder.org/work/by-lifeperiod/1898-1925 [https://perma.cc/AP9H-SN2S].
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See, e.g., Jessica Stewart, Art History: The Evolution of Hypnotic Kinetic Sculptures,
MY MODERN MET (Mar. 27, 2017), https://mymodernmet.com/kinetic-sculpture-arthistory/ [ttps://perma.cc/8E3E-M3U6].
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Id.
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See Grosvenor, supra, note 180.
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Tort and copyright law may value different intents. The purchaser of the art may be
valued by tort law, but not necessarily in copyright law which pays a great deal of attention
to artistic intentions.
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“definition” of what the work was at its creation.198 From Banksy’s
perspective, he clearly intended to see the work as “kinetic” if it was
put on the auction block. It was his pranksterish way of commenting
on the economic and cultural impact of the art marketplace of the
wealthy. He explicitly said so in the video showing the installation
of the device.199 The shredder was intrinsic in the nature of the work
as Banksy conceived it. And, of course, it still may be. For copyright
purposes, it is very similar to Duchamp’s Fountain, Rauschenberg’s
Canyon, or his Mud Muse. In each of these settings, the artists
took utilitarian or non-artistic objects and intentionally integrated
them into artistic creations. The works were another way of commenting on temporality and permanence, stability and instability,
and life and death.
Banksy here placed himself in the same genre as Cattelan and
Fischer. The invisibility of the shredder to the public did not reduce
its role in aesthetic judgments Banksy made when he integrated it
into the inherent nature of the work. Nor did the invisibility of most
of the bubbling system in Rauschenberg’s work. They therefore
must be considered as part and parcel of the works in which they sat.
And it also must be considered as a critical aspect of the two- or
three-dimensional works as defined in the Copyright Act. The
shredder is, in fact, both inseparable from Banksy’s compositional
efforts and totally lacking in utility. Recall that a work of utility is
defined in the Act as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or
to convey information.”200 Once installed, the shredder had no
intrinsic utilitarian function nor did it merely portray the work or
convey information. Rather, it was an instrument of creativity that
operated at the behest of the artist or one of his agents.
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See supra Part I. Recall the Hindenburg Disaster disputes in which the book author’s
labeling of his book as history cemented its base conceit as historical. See Hoehling v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 975–76 (2d Cir. 1980).
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See Grosvenor, supra note 180.
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17 U.S.C. § 101.
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IV. MORAL RIGHTS: BANANAS AND SHREDDERS

The three main works framing the core of this Article by
Duchamp, Cattalan, and Banksy included elements of a moral rights
problem. Each piece was completely or partially destroyed, or
permanently lost to later generations. Art history has its share of
tragedy, humor, and good clean fun! After a lengthy dispute over
whether The Fountain should be shown at the first exhibition of The
American Society of Independent Artists in 1917, it was refused
entry, set up in the studio of the famous American photographer,
Alfred Stieglitz, and photographed. 201 The urinal disappeared not
long after the session with Stieglitz and has not been seen since. 202
The exact story of its disappearance is still a mystery. 203 During the
1950s and 1960s, Duchamp authorized the creation of a series of
replicas.204 These replicas are now scattered in important museums
around the world.205 As discussed, Banksy’s shredder partially
destroyed a work of art. That event created one of the largest, if not
the greatest, art uproar of this young century.
Uproars continued apace when Cattelan’s The Comedian was
taken off an exhibition wall and eaten by David Datuna. 206 Only
the last event may raise issues under provisions of the Visual Artists Rights Act, America’s moral rights statute. 207 The Fountain
disappeared well before the act was adopted in 1990.208 The Banksy
shredding event occurred at Sotheby’s auction house in London, 209
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Marcel Duchamp and the Fountain Scandal, PHILA. MUSEUM OF ART (Mar. 27, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/7A7V-4RYV].
202
Id.
203
For a detailed history and analysis of The Fountain, see generally Camfield, supra
note 60. For the definitive biography of Duchamp, see CALVIN TOMKINS, DUCHAMP: A
BIOGRAPHY, 182–84 (2014). Tomkins’ book is an edited and revised version of the original
edition published in 1996 by the Museum of Modern Art.
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See The Fascinating Tale of Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain, supra note 1.
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See id. The Tate Modern in London, for example, has one of the replicas. See Marcel
Duchamp, Fountain, TATE MOD., https://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/duchamp-fountaint07573[https://perma.cc/4GUW-7EFR].
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See Pogrebin, supra note 2.
207
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
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The Visual Artists Rights Act was adopted by Congress in 1990. Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–650, § 603 603(a) (Dec. 1, 1990), 104 Stat. 5128 (Dec. 1,
1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A).
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See Kumparak, supra note 136.
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outside the jurisdiction of United States intellectual property law.
Datuna’s gustatory destruction of Cattelan’s banana, however,
occurred at Art Basel in Miami in 2019.210 But, just to expand the
example base, the issues arising in all three cases are considered here
despite the inapplicability of the statute in two of the settings.
The moral rights statute has not been a frequent subject of
judicial analysis since its adoption in 1990. One of the most
important judicial disputes arose over the 2014 demise of the
5Pointz aerosol art complex in Long Island City, Queens. 211 Gerald
Wolkoff, the primary owner of the complex, destroyed nearly all of
the works at the complex over twenty years after he first allowed
street artists to paint at the old industrial site.212 That event was
eerily similar to the disappearance of Duchamp’s Fountain—here
today, gone tomorrow. Shortly after the artists failed to obtain a
preliminary injunction barring destruction of the buildings, the
owner had virtually all of the art whitewashed in a burst of
chutzpah.213 Doing so aggravated the court and cut off additional
efforts to enjoin the demolition. The plaintiffs later won a substantial
six and three-quarter million-dollar judgment.214 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that result in 2020.215
Though Duchamp’s urinal and the art at 5Pointz both
disappeared from public view, important differences existed. As the
litigation made clear, 5Pointz was destroyed over the strenuous
objections of the aerosol art community that created the
internationally renowned site.216 But there is a mystery about the
210

See Pogrebin, supra note 2.
For a lengthy piece on the history of 5Pointz and the litigation over its destruction,
see Chused, supra note 84.
212
Alan Feuer, Graffiti Artists Awarded $6.7 Million for Destroyed 5Pointz Murals, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/nyregion/5pointz-graffitijudgment.html [https://perma.cc/GM9X-SXMQ].
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Id.
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Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 2020 WL
5883324 (Oct. 5, 2020)215.
For a detailed discussion, see also an analysis of the oral argument; see also Amanda
Ottaway, Graffiti-Whitewash Appeal Lands with a Thud at 2nd Circuit, COURTHOUSE
NEWS SERVICE (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/graffiti-whitewashappeal-lands-with-thud-at-2nd-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/HGL9-CA2X].
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Castillo, 950 F.3d at 164.
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motivations of those who caused the disappearance of The
Fountain.217 The public does not know what happened to the piece
nor whether Duchamp had anything to do with or knowledge of the
event. Not only did it occur well before the United States adopted
any moral rights provisions, but it is possible that its disappearance
was at the behest of or with the consent of Duchamp—a conclusion
that would preclude a moral right claim altogether.
A similar problem arises with Banksy’s shredder. Though the
object was owned by someone else at the time of its partial
destruction, the artist was responsible for the modification of the
work. The statute provides artists with a cause of action for mutilation or destruction by someone else, but not by themselves. 218
While there are fascinating issues that would arise if the shredder
was altered or removed from Love is in the Bin by the owner, there
were no moral right claims for the events at Sotheby’s.
David Datuna, as noted several times, ate Maurizio Cattelan’s
banana.219 Was that action covered by the moral right scheme? Was
it a mutilation or simply a speeding up of the inevitable? Was it a
destructive event or simply a removal of one banana for its
inevitable replacement by another? Note that the instruction set for
The Comedian suggests that the banana be changed every seven to
ten days.220 Was Datuna, in an odd sense, part of the artistic project?
Perhaps. Emanuel Perrotin, Cattelan’s gallerist, even took one of the
bananas off the wall himself and ate it!221 He is reported as saying,
“Maurizio, it’s a good banana, I have to say.”222 He went on to claim
that in the absence of a certificate of authenticity, anyone removing
a banana without paying the price owns nothing except a banana.
Destructibility, or at least decay, was part and parcel of the
undertaking but an “owner” had to buy the right to tape a banana to
a wall in accordance with Cattelan’s instructions.
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TOMKINS, supra note 203, at 182–84.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3). This, of course, says nothing about the applicability of
the tort system.
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See Pogrebin, supra note 2.
220
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Conceptual art of this sort creates an especially difficult set of
ownership and moral rights problems.223 The provision most applicable to the Cattelan/Datuna escapade is 17 U.S.C § 106A(a)(3):
(a) Rights of Attribution and Integrity.— [T]he
author of a work of visual art224 . . .
(3) [S]hall have the right—
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of that work
which would be prejudicial to his or her
honor or reputation, and any intentional
distortion, mutilation, or modification of that
work is a violation of that right, and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of
recognized stature, and any intentional or
grossly negligent destruction of that work is
a violation of that right.225
Did Datuna violate these provisions? Did he mutilate, modify,
or destroy Comedian? If we take seriously Perrotin’s statement
about the banana itself not being a work of art until a price is
paid for a certificate of authenticity, then Datuna simply enjoyed a
nice repast. He didn’t destroy anything of significance. If, however,
we consider every instance of Cattelan’s Comedian installed in
accordance with the certificate of authenticity and the instructions
223

For a lengthy review of the copyright and moral rights issues that arise with the works
of Sol LeWitt, see generally Chused, “Temporary” Conceptual Art, supra note 84.
224
The Act defines the term “work of visual art” in a way that severely limits the coverage
of American moral right law. 17 U.S.C. § 101 provides:
A “work of visual art” is—
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in
a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in
multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are
consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other
identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author.
225
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3).
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conveyed as part of each sale of the work, then Datuna did destroy
a work of visual art.
As noted in Part II(A), the installed version of Cattelan’s The
Comedian was a derivative work in its own right. 226 In reality, each
installed version of the work is likely to be different from any other
in some way—perhaps another wall, a new banana, a distinct spool
of tape, a slightly altered angle on the wall, a unique banana color,
an unpredictable speed of decay, or a unique atmosphere with new
lighting, wall color, nearby works, gallery or museum, or moment
when a rotten banana is exchanged for a fresh one. But most
importantly for purposes of this Article, the fact that the banana
constantly decays does not remove the possibility that taking down
the banana and eating it is a destructive or mutilating act. Since one
interesting feature of this particular work is witnessing its decay,
interrupting that process is a destructive intervention in the artistic
process on display. It is virtually the same as destroying a work in a
temporary installation made of fairly permanent materials before the
projected closing date for the show. In both cases the temporality of
the art is dramatically interrupted. Indeed, this was one of the major
holdings in the 5Pointz litigation.227 The sudden destruction of the
work, even though it all was destined to be destroyed at some point
in the future, was still deemed a malicious interference with moral
rights. Here, Datuna interrupted the expected seven- to ten-day life
of the banana and destroyed the temporal intentions of Cattelan.
While this Article was in draft stage, the Museum of Modern Art
in New York City temporarily showed photographs by Dorothea
Lange.228 If someone walked in and smashed one of the pictures,
that would surely be an act of destruction despite the fact that the
show was temporary. If the same museum held a temporary
exhibition of rotting bananas put up and maintained by Cattelan and
someone took and ate one of the pieces of fruit, it would for moral
right purposes be no different from the destruction of a Lange image.

226

See supra notes 111–114 and accompanying text.193
Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 167–69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 2020 WL
5883324 (Oct. 5, 2020)215.
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See Dorothea Lange, Pictures and Words, in MUSEUM OF MOD. ART,
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And that reality would not be altered by the ability to make another
copy of the photograph if the original negative still exists. 229
This conclusion about The Comedian, however, does not answer
the moral rights problems associated with Banksy’s shredder. If I
am correct that the shredder must be considered part and parcel of
the before and after works by Banksy, removing or altering it risks
a moral rights claim. That move, of course, would not be made by
Banksy but by the new owner of the half-shredded work. Similarly,
if the new owner elected to restore the work to its original appearance, that also might risk a moral rights claim. Since the shredder
was an intrinsic part of Banksy’s intention to alter Girl with Balloon,
making that intention impossible to put into effect again may create
a problem. If it was Banksy’s intention to only partially shred his
work at the Sotheby’s auction and finish the job if the piece ever
went up for auction again, then removing the shredder significantly
alters the work itself.
These questions, of course, are deeply ironic, if not perverse.
The owner of the new version, Love is in the Bin, may simply want
to protect her investment from total destruction, even though total
destruction may be an eager glimmer in Banksy’s eye if the piece is
again put up for auction. One can assume that if anyone with a
modicum of intelligence wished to bid on the piece now, they surely
would wish to get assurance that the shredder cannot continue its
destructive course. This would require that the back of the piece be
opened up for viewing, that the shredder be inspected by an expert,
and that it be deactivated or removed if necessary.
It certainly is bizarre to conclude that removing the possibility
of destruction is considered a mutilation or destruction of the
underlying work itself. This is what generates the major controversy. What should a court do if confronted with a dispute between
a plaintiff’s plea to remove the possibility of a future damage to
property tort claim and a defendant artist’s plea that to do so violates
the moral right provisions of the Copyright Act? How should that
229

This, of course, does not answer questions about the reduction in reputation or the
recognized stature of a work as required in various parts of 17 U.S.C § 106A(a)(3). Nor
does it refer to the moral rights provisions limiting protection of photographs to those made
for purposes of exhibition in less than 200 copies.
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balance be worked out? It would be odd if the plaintiff is not allowed
to preclude destruction of a work she owns. But it would also be odd
if an artist was barred from pursuing a claim that the owner was
planning to mutilate or destroy a work of fine art.
There is no obvious answer to this dilemma. Perhaps some sort
of compromise is the best we can hope for. From the film of the
shredding event posted by Banksy, it appears that the shredder was
activated by a remote control. Using such a device requires the
existence of some sort of signal receiving system in the artwork.
If there is a small hole in the frame for passage of an infrared signal,
why not allow the owner of the work to tape it over or plug the hole
with an easily removable substance? Or, if the device requires a
battery to remain active, what if the battery was simply removed?
Or what if one wire was removed from a terminal or snipped?
Would any of these be properly viewed as a mutilation or destructtion? Or would it be a disturbance of Banksy’s intentions and therefore an act of mutilation? Perhaps it is best that this issue about the
culture of art and law be left open for further thought.
CONCLUSION

Art is in a constant state of flux. Statutory language, however,
does not change very frequently. Sometimes it lasts for decades.
The Copyright Act of 1909 was not significantly rewritten until
1976, more than forty years ago.230 It was during that time period
that many major shifts occurred in the nature and content of work
widely recognized as making important changes in the nature of art.
Accommodating such changes requires at least three things.
First, the language of statutes must contain enough “wiggle room”
to give judges some flexibility in how they approach new problems
as they arise. Second, there must be active judges who understand
the art world and think deeply about how statutory language may be
used to address new developments. And, finally, it is critical that
judges fully absorb the now classic contention of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes that courts are improper forums for resolving
230
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debates about the quality and importance of new artistic endeavors.
That must be left to society at large.231 Considered together these
three receptors for intelligent use of the Copyright Act are the crux
of this Article.
It is not important whether readers fully agree with the premises.
The only critical matter is that readers are open minded about the
flexibility of words in the existing statute, willing to educate
thoughtful judges about ways they can consider new uses of old
words, and prepared to think about the ways in which artistic movements may be integrated into existing legal system in non-traumatic
ways. Hopefully, this Article produces such results.
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See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252–53 (1903). There,
Holmes noted that:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the
one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation.
Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had
learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may be more
than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the
paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for
the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures
which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they
command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value-it
would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational
value-and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt. It
is an ultimate fact for the moment, whatever may be our hopes for a
change. That these pictures had their worth and their success is
sufficiently shown by the desire to reproduce them without regard to
the plaintiffs’ rights.
Id.

